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‘The fracturing of work and employment relations’ 
 
Abstract 
This article presents an argument that work and employment relationships are increasingly 
‘fractured’ and ‘fragmented’. The argument first reviews the changing contexts of investor-
capitalism (financialisation), which shows that a market ontology and an excessive 
individualistic ideology is pervasive in employment regulation. The expansion of financialised 
capitalism is then related to contemporary employment practices about ‘pay inequality’ and 
‘talent’ selection. These serve to eschew collective structures of collaboration and fragment 
labour standards. The result is a series ‘protective gaps’ about worker voice, legal regulation, 
technology and labour control. A number of challenges and opportunities for the way the 
subject area is taught and researched in mainstream business schools are outlined.   
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1. Introduction.  
I was honoured to be invited to deliver a keynote for the 32nd conference of the Association 
of Industrial Relations Academics of Australia and New Zealand, held in Adelaide in February 
2018. I was first introduced to AIRAANZ at the 17th annual meeting in Melbourne in 2003. I 
have participated in a few meetings since then, and always found the culture and spirit of 
AIRAANZ to be special and rare: long before the obsessive metrics of ‘impact’ and ‘rankings’ 
many AIRAANZ papers would challenge conventional knowledge, tackle real world 
employment issues, and offer contributions concerning public and organisational policy 
debates. Thankfully, AIRAANZ is one of a few academic spaces where people do not speak of 
‘where’ they published, but instead debated the issues arising from research. It is also about 
serious scholarship with a human face, buttressed at the end of a few days of reasoned 
disagreement with the sounds of the AIRAANZ choir, conducted by the forever jovial 
Professor Peetz – whom, after a few AIRAANZ meetings, I would find myself tactically 
dodging in order to evade choir conscription1.  
In this paper I summarise an argument from that keynote, drawn from on-going work with 
colleagues in Manchester, and due recognition and thanks to collaborators is acknowledged 
(Dundon et al., 2017; Dundon and Rafferty, 2018). The argument runs thus: systemic 
contextual factors of investor-capitalism (financialisation) promote an almost exclusive 
marketized value perspective, which reinforces an ideology of individualism.  Consequently, 
the trust and reciprocity that is necessary for sustainable employment relationships are 
increasingly ‘fractured’ and ‘fragmented’.  
                                                          
1 In the interests of protecting delegates from my dulcet of scouse tones, of course ! 
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While the analysis paints a somewhat pessimistic picture because of growing employment 
inequalities, there are plenty of reasons to be optimistic: the subject area is rich, dynamic and 
engaging of policy challenges; and labour agency is creative, with mobilising forces showing 
signs of challenge to structural inequalities.  
In tracing the overall argument, the article is structured as follows. First, the context of 
financialisation and neo-liberalism is reviewed as a lens upon which to discuss subsequent 
employment relations issues of fragmentation (e.g. pay, talent, selection). In section 3 two 
practice areas are reviewed which illustrate the dominance of market value and hyper-
individualism in employment systems: ‘pay inequalities’ and ‘talent’ management. These are 
selective contemporary issues and chosen to show connections between increasing 
marketization and individualism as forces fracturing employment relationships. Other areas 
could have been used such as worker voice, work-life balance, technology or supply chain 
labour relations. Section 4 brings together the context review and practice areas of pay and 
talent to pattern the trajectory of fractured employment relations. The conclusion points to the 
risk of inferior educational pedagogy that advances the same marketized individualism over 
collective or collaborative endeavours that could otherwise engage with wider social systems 
of inclusion across business school curricula.  
 
2.   Context, reciprocity and the threat of investor-capitalism  
The reciprocal nature of the work relationship between employer and employee has 
preoccupied scholars (and practitioners) for centuries. Issues of trust, motivation and control 
remain enduring issues of importance that are central to market-based transactions. Among 
others, Adam Smith’s (1776) Wealth of Nations informed us that markets are socially-
constructed institutions with exchange relationships determined by human interaction, rather 
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than predicated on some benign view of nature or scientific law, as some economists might 
have us believe. Although Smith is often viewed as a founding father of free market ideas, he 
actually explains much: in particular, that markets have both ‘allocative’ and ‘productive’ 
functions. The former is the provision of goods or services (e.g. work tasks) in a market system, 
which has inbuilt exploitative tendencies; for example, how much is shared in wages to workers 
or kept as a surplus by the employer. At the same time, the ‘productive’ function serves to 
mitigate the degree of allocative exploitation. For example while owners want workers to be 
loyal and cooperative, workers also expect to be paid and seek security of job tenure. To this 
end a degree of ‘reciprocity’ is often expected by both parties to a labour market transaction 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005)  
Labour market exchanges are further shaped by changing global forces (McCann, 2013). A 
contemporary development here is the expanding shift towards financialised incentives, 
financial transactions, actors, and the role of financial institutions (Epstein (2005). One effect 
is a corresponding shift in power from managers to owners and investment shareholders (Dore, 
2008). Increasingly, companies are diversifying from their core business activity and seeking 
rents and returns from financial investments. For example, although Enron was a well-known 
fuel and energy conglomerate before its corrupt downfall, most of its returns were obtained 
from speculative money trading. Likewise, General Motors earned more than $800 million in 
2003, not from manufacturing vehicles, but from diversifying into financial services including 
mortgages and finance loans. The core business activity of making cars and trucks earned GM 
only $83 million in the same year (Rubery, 2015). 
Contextual changes such as investor capitalism certainly bring new challenges to work and 
employment relationships. Some claim the future of work is being shaped by advances in 
technology which extend leisure time: robotics and artificial intelligence can be used to replace 
poor or dangerous jobs as people acquire more sophisticated technological skills for new job 
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demands (Brynjolfson and McAfee, 2014). Others argue work in the gig-economy presents 
opportunities for a new entrepreneurial and independent labour class to engage in free market 
exchanges via digital platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, Uber or Deliveroo 
(Botsman 2015). 
On the other hand, however, the realities can be very different. Many digital platforms are 
actually large monopoly corporations that control the technology which eliminate notions of a 
new sharing-economy based around small business entrepreneurs (Howcroft and Bergvall-
Kåreborn, 2018). In terms of employment relations, debates continue about the legal status of 
gig-economy work. Particular concerns include the ambiguous nature of the relationships 
between workers and intermediary platforms, with people who work in the gig-economy denied 
basic protections (Stewart and Standford, 2017). There is a persuasive narrative that much gig 
work is based on a ‘sham contract’ of ‘bogus self-employment’. As a result, Batt (2018) argues 
that with these waves of investor capitalism and financial diversification, owners have little 
incentive to nurture cooperative employment relations with workers. Indeed, it is feasible that 
regardless of new digitalised business models and automation, employers utilise cheap sources 
of labour rather than invest in expensive technologies. Importantly, the future of work and the 
uses of technology are not based on some natural or neutral (deterministic) force: they are 
shaped by hierarchical and socio-political relationships affecting work and employment 
conditions.  
Of course it is not evident that the context of investor or financialised capitalism means all 
corporations seek to exploit workers by re-defining employees as self-employed gig-contactors 
or replace jobs with automation. Unilever, for example, actively seek to upgrade labour 
standards and have a corporate responsibility goal to minimise precarious and temporary labour 
contracts across its global supply network (Wilshaw et al., 2016). However, financialisation 
has deeper and often unseen spill-over implications affecting work and employment relations 
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in various ways. It may be, for instance, that exemplars such as Unilever become targets for 
hostile corporate take-overs which damage employment standards and job security through 
ownership change (McCann, 2013). Moreover, the shift to investor-capitalism has led to 
pressures to seek greater surplus value from squeezing labour costs, in both the private and 
public sectors (Cushen and Thompson, 2016).  
It is this nuanced understanding that shows how senior management have become more 
closely supervised by shareholders and private equity consortia. One issue is whether managers 
become trained to ‘champion labour cuts’ by imposing austerity, reducing peoples’ pensions 
or enabling restructuring for hostile takeovers (Palpacuer et. Al., 2011). The broader socio-
economic and political framework is that of neo-liberalism: defined as an ‘ideological doctrine’ 
that seeks value by ‘liberating individual entrepreneurship through strong property rights, free 
markets and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005:2). Neo-liberalism provides the ideological basis for 
greater individualism in work and employment, inspired from the market deregulation by the 
likes of Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the US. These espoused self-interest and individual 
greed as the route to success, with an active suspicion of any institutions that protect workers 
(e.g. minimum wage legislation, trade unions, or unfair dismissal laws). In the work relations 
sphere, developments include the coming of age of modern consumerism where the promotion 
of greater ‘individualism’ is epitomised with a fusion of workers as consumers, all bounded by 
some faith in market values that also dovetail into employment relations (Donaghey et al, 
2014).  
The context of financialised capitalism and greater individualism is not inherently correct 
or incorrect. Empirical security and wider societal engagement is necessary to understand how 
these contextual forces affect peoples’ employment situation. Employers change their values 
over time and managers, as agents of owners, devise practices which can reinforce a preferred 
individualism to work premised on market rationality or their own vested interest concerns for 
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control. As Smith (1779) reminded us earlier, markets are ‘socially constructed’ and modern 
management ideas (say, for instance, for things like ‘talent acquisition’ or ‘individual 
performance-pay’) are not based on some condition of evolutionary principles or quasi-
scientific economic laws: these are, first and foremost, employment conditions that are socially 
constructed and historically determined. 
The ideological dominance of market values and individualism in employment and 
management studies scholarship has not gone unchallenged (Harley, 2015; Rubery et al, 2016). 
Even Hayek (1988), a leading market ideologue, recognised that society is often based on 
collective structures for the purposes of collaboration and cooperation and free markets help to 
break-down community tribal instincts. In the next section, two contemporary employment 
relations practices are critiqued using lens of financialised capitalism (namely ‘talent 
management’ and ‘performance pay’). These both illustrate a strong ideological undercurrent 
of individualism and market-based value in shaping employment relations. There are of course 
many other issues which could have been examined using this approach (e.g. employee voice, 
gender, employment contract status, gig-work, unionisation, the role of technology, bogus self-
employment etc), which may be the basis of future research.     
 
3. The ideological drive to individualize labour  
Pay inequality  
Hardly a week goes by without some news report or review of the gross inequalities around 
ever widening gender pay gaps; or how out of sync chief executive remuneration is compared 
to average worker wages. In the UK, for example, around 78 per cent of firms pay men more 
than women (Britton ad Wyatt, 2018). In Australia, CEO salaries are often a multiple of 30-
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times the average worker wage, with executives reported as receiving 12 per cent pay rises 
with annual bonuses exceeding 18 per cent of their salary (Davies, 2018). 
And here is the ruse: these gross salary awards are premised on a view of market rationality 
when in fact they are self-reinforcing and socially-constructed. The shift to investor-capitalism 
and neo-liberal doctrines has witnessed a move away from collective bargaining as a 
mechanism to allocate and distribute rewards, to a view premised on some notion of individual 
choice and market value. Importantly, pay for effort has always been shaped by perceptions of 
fair reward: distributive (how much) and procedural (how allocated) justice values (Gelens et. 
al., 2013). Pay can be based on market comparison criteria of referent groups, which has some 
objective perception. However, it also has a huge subjective component (Hofmans, 2012), and 
for many senior executives it appears that an air of superiority legitimises their huge pay 
premium based on social hierarchy (Kaplan, 2012).  
Under investor-capitalism, issues of wider societal poverty are typically seen as the remit of 
government welfare policy; removed from organisational managers and shareholders who do 
not share any responsibility. Yet there are now over 8 million people defined as living in 
poverty in the UK who reside in working households (Schmuecker, 2018). In other words, ‘in-
work poverty’ is a growing issue affecting more and more workers and businesses. Arguably, 
it is no coincidence that the two countries that have witnessed the largest increases in income 
inequality, the UK and US, are those where ideas of performance pay and individualised 
employment regimes prevail, with the rise of so-called ‘super-managers’ justifying huge 
executive pay packets (Piketty, 2014). 
While it has been argued that market conditions may justify high earnings for so-called top 
executives based on their unique expertise (Dicks, 2012), the validity of such is highly 
questionable. It may be more realistic, given unregulated corporate governance regimes, that 
executives define their market value as corporate insiders through self-justified remuneration 
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packages. Pay-for-performance decisions are political and socially constructed and a 
managerial discourse of market justification hides the true privilege of an executive corporate 
class. These issues about pay inequality signal deeper implications for the field of work and 
employment relations; namely, how to objectively attribute value to labour effort, particularly 
in higher discretion roles or under conditions of advanced technological development which 
may render certain skills redundant. Such issues remain central to the future of work and how 
pay can be regulated and allocated in more just and equal ways. One option to regulate pay is 
via Wage Boards which comprise representatives of all sides of industry, including an 
independent chair (Hughes and Dundon, 2018). These can be public bodies who regulate pay 
levels (including ‘living wage’ variations) in defined low paid sectors (e.g. health care, gig-
economy, hairdressing, retail, hospitality, cleaning etc). Indeed, it is probable that such policy 
debates and considerations will be high on the research agendas of future AIRAANZ and other 
similar conferences.  
Running alongside pay inequalities premised on false idea of market rationalisation is the 
ideology of individualism, which can be illustrated further when reviewing the contemporary 
development of talent management, considered next. 
 
The cult of ‘individual ‘talent’ 
‘Talent management’ (TM) is reviewed here because of its ideological orientations of 
individualism and ideas of market value, which link to the debates about the fracturing of 
reciprocity in employment relations. TM is defined as ‘efforts to attract, select, develop and 
retain key talented employees … with the greatest potential to impact on value generation in 
an organisation’ (Collings et al., 2018). A core issue here is the aspect of finding and selecting 
‘key’ employees who hold particular ‘positions’ to add to corporate performance. TM emerged 
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in the early 2000s, initially offered as a product by McKinsey Consulting with their strapline 
the ‘War for Talent’ (McDonald, 2013). Academic curiosity and practitioner interest in TM 
has burgeoned with special issues of academic journals devoted to the topic along with new 
textbooks (Scullion et al., 2010; Farndale et al., 2010; Al-Ariss et al., 2014; Collings et al., 
2017). It seems the topic is likely to grow and be around for some time to come.  
The critique of TM as part of the fracturing of employment is four-fold: TM is mostly 
‘atheoretical’; it can be exposed as little more than a ‘hollow shell’ of home-spun wisdom; the 
managerialist discourse of talent sustains wider ‘societal inequalities’; and finally TM 
literatures are mostly ignorant of known ‘knowledge paradigms associated with managing 
employment systems’.  
The first concern is the apparent lack of a distinct theoretical lens for TM (Lewis and 
Heckman, 2006:140). For example, TM literature is reminiscent of well-established work and 
human resource management concepts that privilege a unitarist and individualistic orientation: 
the psychological contract, human capital, strategic value, or ability-motivation-opportunity to 
enhance corporate performance (Collings, 2014b). To this end it has been noted that the talent 
narrative may be little more than ‘old wine in new bottles’ (Collings, 2014a). 
Second is the ‘hollow shell’ thesis of a discourse that views labour as individualised talent 
for market value. In reality, people display talent in many ways and most of these have very 
little to do with the pursuit of corporate profit. To some extent the discourse of ‘talent’ seeks 
to colonise management studies for its own culturally manipulative ends (Willmott, 1993). For 
example, an act of resistance to improve intolerable working conditions is often inspired by 
groups of employees and their unions, yet such creativity and innovation is outside the biased 
managerialist agenda of talent for corporate value. Thus arguing talent is only about 
competitive advantage is misleading and inaccurate. Indeed, the TM agenda seeking to portray 
the drive to be the top talent can be seen as an act of aggressive or macho competition among 
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rival firms. When translated to workplace relations, such a discourse serves to undermine 
employee-employer cooperation by engineering the language of warfare ‘between’ workers as 
being normal (Bunting, 2011). Importantly, there is plenty of talent where profit or rival 
warfare is not the guiding purpose of an organisation; in public service, charities and NGOs. 
The result is that the TM literature espouses little more than simplistic homespun pockets of 
wisdom (cf McDonnell, 2018).  
A further concern is the implications that affect the lives of workers and their families. On 
the positive side of TM there is what can be defined as an ‘inclusive’ talent pool (Collings et 
al., 2018). Under this system it is implied that all employees may be included for their various 
roles and contributions. Notwithstanding good intentions, however, there is no reason to 
assume that all workers want to be defined as ‘key’ talent and moved into some defined talent 
pool. Inclusivity in this regard is set and determined unilaterally by managers alone.   
More problematic, however, is the contrasting ‘exclusive’ labour pool. Under this model, 
employees are separated according to management defined criteria for ‘top’ talent (Meyers and 
van Woerkon, 2014). Under the McKinsey ‘War for Talent’ strapline, for instance, 
organisations were encouraged to introduce a system of ‘forced ranking’ to create segregated 
employee talent pools. At the peak of the hierarchy are those employees in key positions who 
are deemed as the top-performers (so-called ‘A’ star players), and they are highly rewarded 
(see previous section). Next are average-employees (the ‘B’ league players) who need to 
improve. At the bottom is poor-performers (the ‘C’ grade players) who are actively managed 
out of a firm.  
The selection into the exclusive labour pool is premised on managements’ view of work 
roles which directly link to value and market performance. A consequence is an engendered 
culture of increasing materialism based on market value of so-called talent individuals, with 
the role of other groups of workers deemed to be less talented. The result is organisations 
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following the fad of talent management may end up with less diversity, as managers recruit 
like-for-like premised on very narrow interpretations of talent criteria (Marchington, 
2015:177). Arguably, therefore, ‘exclusive’ TM pools end up devaluing those employees who 
occupy unseen yet nonetheless important back-office roles, perhaps resulting in low morale, 
poor self-esteem, worker alienation and deepening inequalities.  
Finally, the TM literatures fails to recognise the known issues associated with work and 
employment systems, especially difficulties of ensuring labour reciprocity and collaboration. 
Various knowledge contributions that span decades are mostly absent in much TM literatures, 
including areas such as employment rights, voice and engagement, union bargaining, equal 
opportunities, power and labour indeterminacy, legislation, the role of the State and other 
labour market institutions, or emotional work debates, stress and issues of dignity, respect and 
well-being (Thunnissen et al, 2013:330). In other words, TM is considerably underdeveloped 
as a distinct knowledge paradigm in its own right.  
In sum, the context of finalisation and neo-liberalism has promoted a distinct privilege for 
market-based rationalisations over and above other stakeholder or wider social inclusion 
concerns. The posture for marketization and excessive individualism is evidenced in selected 
employment relations practice areas reviewed above; namely pay and talent. In the next section 





3. The potential fracturing and fragmentation of employment relationships? 
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The above reviews of ‘pay inequalities’ and ‘individualised talent’ are illustrative of a 
marketised ontology affecting work and employment relationships. These have purposely been 
reviewed and critiqued against a contextual framework of increasingly financialisation and 
neo-liberalism. In this section, links between the aforementioned context factors are used to 
outline the extent to which employment relationships are ‘fractured’, ‘disjointed’ and 
‘disconnected’ across different levels and between multiple actors. 
Fragmentation can be evidenced across various employment practice areas such as voice, 
bargaining and consultation. On the one hand, it may be viable that non-union forms of voice 
may combine to offer complementary synergies with other institutional governance 
mechanisms, say with union bargaining or the co-existence with European Works Councils 
(EWCs). A recent development in this area is that of ‘double-breasting’ voice, whereby 
management choose to develop non-union employee representation (NER) channels at one 
plant, while simultaneously recognising unions at another company location (Cullinane et al 
2012, Dundon et al 2015). In this regard, double-breasting fragments employment 
relationships, as employers chose to play one group of workers in a certain location off against 
another set of workers in a different plant. Examples seem to also be prevalent where employers 
seek to attract foreign direct investment (Lavelle et al 2010). A further fragmented aspect of 
NER is that worker influence can be quite brittle and susceptible to change. For example, it has 
been reported that NER voice arrangements have multiple ‘faces’, which cannot be shoehorned 
into any one single or specific typology (Marchington and Dundon, 2017). The capacity for 
non-union employee voice to influence management action is often absent or marginal, 
particularly in liberal market contexts, as outcomes can depend on various factors including 
national business systems, context, location, product and job market, occupational mix, and 
whether managerial strategy or ideology is to avoid or resist unionisation in hostile or other 
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ways (Marchington and Dundon, 2017). Unaided, non-union voice may fragment and 
disconnect bargaining from a unions’ membership constituency.  
Disjointed and disconnected employment relationships are also important, including the 
actions of the State and how deregulated rights can disenfranchise many workers and 
consolidate managerial power. Globally, there has been a growing disconnection between 
collective rights which are in decline, and an emphasis on many fragment individual rights 
(Howell 2005). In liberal market regimes dominated by investor-capitalism the role of the State 
has typically shifted away from collective bargaining, towards more and more individual soft 
regulations to support people at their workplace (Williams and Scott 2016). For example, the 
waves of European legislation as part of the EU’s wider social model provide rights to 
individual workers, not collective based systems of employment regulation or representation. 
In addition, governments of various political persuasions have sought to reduce social and 
welfare provisions with a diminished ability of the State to counter corporate influence, which 
has prompted a fragmented mass of disconnected individual workers (Howell 2005). The on-
going political agenda for deregulating labour markets, as an alleged attraction for foreign and 
multinational investment, has impacted on groups of workers by undervaluing their status in 
the labour market, such as women (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). Weakened employment 
conditions may be witnessed also by the extent to which the State opts-out of being seen as a 
‘good model employer’, and instead uses harder and more unilateral regulatory approaches 
(Inversi et al., 2017).  
These issues of disconnection and fragmentation can be found in growing labour market 
insecurity and work precariousness (Kalleberg, 2011; Standing 2011). Workers on atypical or 
non-standard employment contracts (for example gig-economy workers) become fearful of 
losing their job, or worried about managerial reprisals should they activate limited voice rights 
for information and to speak-up (Cullinane et al., 2017). Grimshaw et al (2016) show how work 
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and employment conditions are increasingly affected by the extent to which workers encounter 
one or more of four ‘protective gaps’, which further reflect the market ontology and hyper-
individualism discussed previously in sections 2 and 3: i) gaps in employment standards such 
as minimum rights; ii) voice and representation, including gaps that disallow for union 
membership; ii) structures to enforcement gaps, such as reduced access to resources and 
monitoring agencies; and iv) social protection gaps, including reduced access to pensions in 
old age and unemployment benefit. 
A particular contemporary issue is the potential fragmentation arising from technology and 
new business models such as the gig-economy. Importantly, issues of ‘contract status’ and 
technology can undermine trust and reciprocity in work relationships, with a shift of risk from 
a business to the individual (McCann, 2014). In addition, the intermediary agencies running 
digital labour platforms tend to control finance flows and can often delay paying the worker 
until the end-user is satisfied, or until the intermediary is paid first. There have also been legal 
cases which cast doubt on the validity of self-employment under such conditions. In the case 
of Szilagyi,2 for example, a British Court of Appeal decided that a so-called ‘partnership 
relationship’ was in fact a sham and in reality those engaged were employees. Further, in the 
US the Californian Labor Commission determined that Uber drivers are not independent 
contractors and are in fact employees (Kaine, 2015).  
However, legal judgements are contestable and rights remain uneven from case to case and 
across jurisdictions. Even though decisions have favoured Uber workers in the UK and 
California, in Australia the Fair Work Commission ruled that Uber drivers are not employees 
but ‘independent contractors’ (Guzman, 2018). Likewise, Deliveroo in the UK persuaded the 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) that riders are self-employed and therefore the company 
                                                          
2 Protectacoat Firthglow Ltd v Szilagyi [2009] EWCA Civ 98 CA.  
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did not have to provide holiday pay (Butler, 2017). The effect is a further extension to the idea 
of individual responsibility and market-based justifications as sources of influence on worker 
rights.   
A final point of discussion from work fracturing issues includes the implications for the way 
the subject area is taught (and researched) in mainstream business schools. Briefly, issues of 
fragmentation may be found in educational approaches that seem to serve managerial interests 
(Barry and Wilkinson 2015; Kaufman, 2015).  For example, Morrison (2011) argues that 
employee grievances are not formal employee voice channels because they divert from 
supporting organisational goals by the act of complaining. Problematically, under such a 
perspective employee interests are somehow assumed to be aligned with employers and all 
parties are united by a common objective, aligned to market-based justifications and the unitary 
idea of individual talent discussed earlier. 
When translated to education and student learning, the risk is of an inbuilt bias towards the 
same sort of market value principles and individualistic ideology. For example, Fernández-
Rodriguez (2014: 186) argues that such approaches are dominated by a particular ‘American 
way of business’ that favours free market ontology, to the neglect of other social science 
paradigms of knowledge and learning. The outcome may be that students of business, 
employment or management may be taught in ways that favour market and individual 
principles which ignore collective systems of voice and employment regulation that are as 
equally legitimate, and which offer the opportunity for students to consider critical issues and 
important debates about the role of business and management in wider society (Bridgman et. 
al., 2016). 
The overall analysis need not be viewed as a pessimistic message. To be sure workers show 
creativity in how they mobilise and organise to address inequalities and managerial biases, as 
unions are doing in the gig-economy (Wood et al., 2018) and elsewhere (gall and Kirk, 2018). 
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Other agency movements in social and political spaces are addressing protective gaps with 
positive supports for marginalised groups of workers; for example, LGBT societies and groups 
supporting ethnic minorities (Heery et al 2012; Perrett and Martinez Lucio 2008). Importantly, 
these insights make for a richer and more informed learning experience supporting the person 
and their journey through education and life, rather than teachings which do little but reinforce 
even further corporate greed or support some other exclusive market-led interest group.   
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has summarised an argument suggesting that work and employment relationships 
are in part fractured and fragmented: that is peoples’ rights, as workers and citizens, are 
disjointed and uneven. In short, the reciprocity and trust required for sustainable employment 
is potentially broken. The argument was traced to global context factors of financialisation, 
suggesting that local employment practices are increasingly focused on individualism and a 
desire for market value. Pay inequalities and a cult of individualised talent were used to 
illustrate these points in some detail. Other examples were evidenced around disconnected 
employee voices, fractured equalities and disjointed rights owing to a series of protective gaps 
(Grimshaw et al., 2017). As a result, wider societal issues of equality and inclusion may be 
neglected in how the subject area is taught in mainstream business schools, with a potential 
crisis of irrelevance to the world of work and management.  
While the analysis may be seen in part as pessimistic, there is in fact a sanguine future when 
recognising the creativity and agency of labour to challenge inequalities. I also opened the 
paper by noting the rich traditions of AIRAANZ with its reasoned disagreements of social 
science scholarship, which offers a degree of optimism for better engagement through policy-
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